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performing intentional acts: “Our basic 
claim is that representations come into 
existence and derive their content from 
their role supporting the basic intention-
ality of action” (Rosenberg and Anderson, 
2004).
A philosophical version of this same 
approach can be found in Wittgenstein’s 
(1953) work. In particular, it is present in 
his analysis of two broad ways of deter-
mining meaning: briefly, (1) meaning as 
something “grasped in a flash” (in the pre-
sent context, a representation as a static 
model); (2) meaning as something extended 
in time (in the present context, representa-
tions of “action”). He pointed out that these 
two ways of determining the meaning of a 
word often appear to clash and so be seen 
as mutually exclusive. Wittgenstein’s analy-
sis resolves the apparent clash through the 
intermediate notion of an “application” 
which has the useful conceptual qualities 
of being both something that can be repre-
sented “in a flash” but also requires exten-
sion over time.
A consequence of Wittgenstein’s analy-
sis is that the search for “dual” systems in 
the brain that deal with the supposed dual 
layer of perception (representational and 
action-oriented perception) is not crucial. 
If the brain is in the business of detecting 
potential “applications” (of the body it coor-
dinates) then it can have a thoroughly syn-
thetic architecture to achieve its purpose.
In fact, the bi-directional flow of infor-
mation through the hierarchy instantiates 
just such “applications” since it incorporates 
applications being “grasped in a flash” (the 
top-down expectation) and applications 
being extended over time (the bottom-
up detection of instances of “strategic 
interference”).
This analysis also highlights “goals,” 
“desires” (emotions), “rewards,” and “val-
ues” as inherent in neural processing. Uses 
or applications are “intentional”; they 
A commentary on
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated 
agents, and the future of cognitive science
by Clark, A. (in press). Behav. Brain Sci.
I suggest two refinements of Clark’s 
(in press) account of predictive brains 
and situated agents. The first concerns the 
idea of the brain as a “predictive machine” 
(Clark, in press, Section 1). Simply, the brain 
does not predict how the world is but, rather, 
it trials actions that represent opportunities 
for adaptive ways of “going on” in the world.
The second concerns how this neurosci-
entific understanding relates to the action 
of socially situated agents (Clark, in press, 
Section 3.4). Briefly, interested social inter-
action employs symbolic and linguistic 
means to explore and trial opportunities for 
nuanced strategies of social action. In par-
ticular, analyses of discursive tactics (e.g., 
Edwards and Potter, 1992) replicate, at the 
interpersonal level, the “trialing” approach 
to achieving adaptive ends.
The main adaptive problem for cogni-
tion is not the reduction of uncertainty or 
to predict how the world is; it is the need 
to identify adaptive “ways to go on,” or act. 
Such a rendering of the adaptive problem 
for cognition usefully sidesteps notions 
of prediction, foresight, and other episte-
mological concerns. In the deepest sense, 
adaptive behaviors are based on “fortu-
nate” coincidences rather than knowledge-
grounded predictions. Natural selection 
engineers these fortunate matches.
This refinement also foregrounds emo-
tional responses as central to so-called fore-
sight. Emotional engagement represents a 
top-down “desire” about how an organ-
ism would prefer to act in the world. As 
action unfolds, those desires (preferences 
for action) get representationally trialed 
against the continuous flow of input from 
levels lower in the processing hierarchy.
In this way, cognition is understood in its 
motivational, emotional, embodied, and sit-
uated senses. This approach also emphasizes 
the agentic aspect of organismic behavior. 
Every organism has “sunk capital” (i.e., 
evolved neural architecture and specific 
embodiment) in preferred ways of acting 
and responding to the world. Its challenge 
is to use that capital to operate adaptively. 
Modeling the world in any disinterested 
manner is a luxury; quickly identifying 
adaptive ways to go on is a necessity.
In this conceptualization, “prediction 
error” is a misleading term. Information 
fed-forward through the neural hierarchy 
is not “error” (i.e., in relation to a “model”) 
but concerns instances of “strategic interfer-
ence” (Hill and Buss, 2008).
Applying this notion of “strategic inter-
ference” more generally, perception, atten-
tion, consciousness, and the associated 
so-called “hierarchical predictive process-
ing” in neural architecture are all designed 
to identify and respond to various obstacles 
(interferences or interruptions) to achiev-
ing and completing actions that have been 
initiated in the nervous system. The notion 
of “surprisal,” in its neuroscientific sense, 
is thus already an interested process: it is a 
neural event that signals likely “obstacles” to 
preferred action (i.e., it highlights features 
that require modifying actions to achieve 
adaptive ends).
The brain does not need to be involved 
in “guessing as to what is out there [in the 
world]” (Clark, in press, Section 4.4 para 
3) through representational modeling. 
Instead, representations are directly related 
to action. As Rosenberg and Anderson 
(2004, no page) have argued, “what makes 
a given item representational is its role in 
providing guidance to the cognitive agent 
for taking actions with respect to the rep-
resented object.” In this way, a representa-
tion is a representation by virtue of it being 
used to represent the process of an agent 
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 incorporate ends. By contrast, as Clark 
(in press) notes, predictions of states of 
affairs are not – hence leading to a “desert 
landscape.” Employing the concept of an 
application (“pre-loaded” with intention-
ality) avoids the “desert landscape” while 
retaining its “austerity” benefits (i.e., pro-
cessing and energetic requirements).
From this perspective, the insights 
summarized by Clark (in press) can be 
directly extended to agent-level cognition 
and experience (Clark, in press, Section 
4.1). In particular, work in discursive and 
social constructionist psychology shows 
how these social and discursive “tactics” 
are compatible extensions of Clark’s thesis 
into “agent-level” phenomena.
Attempts by agents to make use of dis-
courses in their interactions in effect trial 
possible social uses (applications) available 
in socially situated settings. As Edwards and 
Potter (1992) discuss, these situated acts 
are fundamentally “motivated” and “inter-
ested.” They achieve “discursive work” (e.g., 
blaming, inviting, apportioning responsi-
bility, etc.). Discursive success relies upon 
skillful detection of obstacles for achieving 
this work. (Suggestions for an argumenta-
tive basis of reasoning and cognition pro-
vide support for this view – see Mercier and 
Sperber, 2011).
The above suggestions improve prospects 
for understanding motivated, emotion-
ally based “foresight” as an evolutionarily 
grounded cognitive adaptation. They also 
help resolve difficulties in accounts of cog-
nition that emphasize knowledge-based 
representations as guides to action.
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